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ABSTRACT 
Coordination by Default or by Design 
Implementlng Education Programs in Post-Conflict:- The South Sudan Experience 
The process of rebuilding and reconstruction after war is a long, demanding and arduous 
process. Different actors are involved, drawn from the local community, neighboring countries 
and international arena. The actors come with various expectations, interests, resources and 
demands in programs implementation. Each actor has their own way and understanding of 
doing things based on where they have come from. To further complicate the process, 
coordination issues, whether planned or unplanned, become an imperative and have to be 
addressed or further strengthened so as to meet the objectives of the various actors involved. 
Implementing education in post conflict countries has seen its fair share of these complexities. 
Driven by different interests, needs, expectations and demands, there is a lack of clarity among 
the different actors, which ultimately has a negative impact on the success of programs. Using 
a case study of the Community girl's school, a Non-Formal program implemented in south 
Sudan, I will explore and examine the missed opportunities that arise when there is lack of 
clarity at the onset and continuation of implementing education programs. The author will 
address coordination challenges that are faced by different actors working in Post-Conflict 
scenarios and how these affect program implementation. The author argues that coordination 
issues especially in post-conflict scenarios should be clearly included in program plans and not 
merely assumed. Data used is largely drawn from the authors experience in implementing the 
program, interviews of the respective people working in the different organizations, former and 
current officials from the government representatives and reports submitted on the program. 
The study will also examine the envisioned roles of the concerned actors involved, their 
objectives, roles and coordination efforts within the program that was implemented and how 
that contributed towards the overall impact of the program. 
Finally, the project will analyze the lessons that can be drawn from the analysis including 
ineffective oversight, clarifying terms and mandates and communication across and among all 
actors. The study recommends among other factors the need to not only involve community in 
designing programs but also clarifying goals, roles and responsibilities. Coordination should 
not be a design by default but rather well planned and budget for with clearly articulated goals. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
"We need better coordination on the international side ... We have too 
many reconstruction and development assistance plans. " 
Jan Egeland 
Introduction 
As is characteristics of post-conflict settings, the number of international organizations and 
other grassroots organizations increases for a myriad of reasons. Different organizations 
respond to arising needs using different mechanisms and often times at different times. 
Resources for example, human or financial, are sourced and come from different channels, 
such as governments, religious institutions or humanitarian organizations. These organizations 
bring with them different beliefs, mandates and eventually different reasons for responding to 
the needs among others. Thus the need to coordinate has over the years been reechoed over 
time as a necessity within these settings. Despite the increase of rhetoric, other program issues 
often times supersede the need for coordination, which in most times is expected to weave in 
with other program activities. 
Having worked in a post-conflict setting, the memories of my first visits and organization 
meetings are still etched in my brain. The nature of the environment then demanded that we 
work together especially for security purposes. My first visit to south Sudan was in October 
2002, where I went to work for an international organization as a literacy trainer. In this area, 
the organization I was representing was known to have presence (worked and were known 
within the region) though we still did not have a compound. I thus stayed with another host 
international organization that had been there for a while. There were three other 
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organizations working on different aspects of education and my presence there representing 
another big organization was seen as a blessing to the Sudanese and as a soft threat to other 
education partners who had been there for a while and were dealing with education. This 
meant that even when we were called for meetings, being tactful was essential and one only 
gave away the necessary information at the same time trying to learn best what others were 
doing or planning to do. The first coordination meeting, as they were then called, that I 
attended had been called by an important official representative from the South Sudan Relief 
and rehabilitation Agency (SRRA) the relief agency that coordinated all relief services in 
south Sudan under the Sudan people Liberation Army, (SPLA). The only contribution I 
remember making were my name and the agency I worked for. Looking back this was the first 
of the many coordination meetings that I was to attend that I would say was more of 
information sharing get together than coordination meetings. Information is carefully shared 
not to expose too much and respectful of not 'stepping on other toes. The fear of being 'ran 
out" of the field and hence completion was real in the NGO world. 
Coordination issues in conflict and post-conflict settings are not a new vocabulary. In many 
cases, the "ability or skill to coordinate with others" (taken from a job description) comes as 
part of their job descriptions in many organizations. Interpretation of what this entails within 
and outside the organization is most often not elaborated. Different people have different 
understanding of what coordination means or what it entails and hence all the good intentions 
for coordination can later emerge as bones of contentions. General acceptance of the issue and 
its rhetoric thereof seems not to enlighten the practical challenges of following it through and 
coordination for many organizations has proved to be more of a dreaded task than an easy 
thing for various reasons. Indeed, one research report introduced the topic as an agreed upon 
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principle but a source of irritation and frustration in practice hence and "old sore" (Brabant, 
1999. ). Plans without coordination are a source of irritations and frustrations and this could 
ultimately negatively impede the progress of the good plans and efforts put in. 
From my experience, I am aware of, and acknowledge the challenges involved in planning 
coordination meeting. As simple as it sounds; coordination requires not just the input of time 
for planning and getting people together but costs as well. The frequency number of times that 
coordination issues and meetings were planned increased over the years while I worked in the 
post conflict settings. This sometimes-meant reorganizing time and budget. I do believe in 
working around flexibility to a certain limit beyond which impedes a program's progress. 
Such meetings and the mention of coordination as one of the challenges in a number of post 
conflict literatures may perhaps be pointing towards the direction for the need to reconsider 
what we mean by coordination and how coordination is to be planned. The challenges of post 
conflict education and the multiple players involved in implementing programs, the complexity 
of environment within which programs are to be carried out highlights the need for 
coordination by all actors for effective program implementation. The case study looks at how 
coordination issues are understood at the field level by the different players involved and how 
that plays out within a program being implemented. 
In the course of this study, I came across several reports and articles that highlighted or stated 
different coordination issues be it of aid or programs, as one of the challenges that have to be 
addressed in implementing programs in post conflict settings. One research report by World 
Bank for example, talks of the "battles for AID" (Precise, p.g. 2) and the challenges involved in 
coordinating aid by different donors in different contexts. Indeed on of the twelve indicators of 
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progress in the Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness is "4. To strengthen capacity by 
coordinated efforts" (OECD, 2005, p.g. 9.) 
Few reports and articles have defined what they mean by coordination and even fewer how 
coordination efforts should be carried out. The confusion in even defining some of these terms 
and the language used to refer to the post conflict jargon and terminology such as peace 
building (Schirch, L. 2006) compounds the problem and impacts how coordination is carried 
out. There is not one agreed meaning of coordination (Sommers, 2004) and even where 
coordination is defined, at least in paper, the challenges and realities in the field shows that 
coordination is not as easy as it is assumed to be. Different challenges are faced by the different 
actors 1 at different levels in an already challenging environment, yet despite these challenges, 
there is the call in different reports, requirement and push to coordinate efforts for effective 
running of programs. 
Coordination challenges is not a new problem and efforts to address the issues have been under 
way with other international bodies such as the, UNOCHA that oversees all humanitarian wing 
coordination, INEE that seeks to network with all international NGOs and others organizations. 
The different groups work towards addressing the problem for example through the cluster 
system, the UN new initiatives of planning together as humanitarian body and organizations 
coming together to form alliances such as the save the children alliance among others. Such 
initiatives among other agendas are to work together and coordinate their work. 
1 l n this study l have used the word 'actors" to include everyone involved in implementing education, this includes donors, humanitarian 
organizations, International oq,,~nizations, governments or Non-state actors and community leaders. 
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The study is made up of four chapters; Chapter one sets the background of the study and 
introduces the setting of the study, the problem statement and the methodology are discussed. 
Chapter two is the literature review that begins with a brief summary of the role education is 
seen to play in post-conflict settings, discusses various definitions and goes on to look at the 
political, economic and technical issues that causes tensions and concerns in implementing 
education programs in post conflict settings. The chapter ends by looking at five challenges 
involved in coordination of education in post conflict settings. Chapter three introduces the 
South Sudan case study and the actors involved in implementing the community girl's school 
and the roles each actor played. The final chapter looks at the key themes and gives some 
practical considerations and recommendations that can be used in coordinating programs. 
Background to the study 
South Sudan Context 
The history of south Sudan is characterized by conflict mainly between the North and the south, 
and has been termed as one of the longest civil war in Africa since its independence in 1956 
(Deng, 2000,). The war further deepened the already existing inequalities between the North 
and the South. (Deng, 2000) South Sudan vast region is rich in its unique diversity; one region 
enjoys an equatorial climate, while another region has to deal with the heat and climate 
conditions of the harsh semi arid-desert climate. Other than war, south Sudan has had to deal 
with two major famines, one in 1988 and another 10 years later that not only plunged the 
country further into poverty but also claimed more than 300,000 lives (Deng 2002). The 1988 
famine drew media attention and International pressures on the Government of Sudan to allow 
humanitarian efforts be delivered to southern Sudan led to the formation of Operation Lifeline 
Sudan(OLS) in 1989, a consortium of organization between the UN and NGOs. An agreement 
12 
between the SPLM, the UN and GOS was signed to allow humanitarian assistance to be 
delivered to all parts as needed.(Deng, 2003). OLS operated from Northern Kenya and helped 
to coordinate the UN and 3 5 other organizations offering relief to South Sudan. Social services 
in south Sudan were largely provided under the OLS through the International organizations. 
While SPLM relief wing SRRA assisted in facilitating the coordination, dominance was largely 
under the International influence. 
Education in South Sudan 
Characteristic of post conflict countries, education services were severely affected. School 
going children were either in the army or looking for food. Under the SPLM, education 
governance was established as part of the SPLM resolution for self-reliance, articulated in one 
of the key documents-Peace through Development. (Deng, 2003) The education policy 
documents that clearly spelt out the goals, vision and mission of the SPLM education were 
launched in 2002. Other documents such as the EF A were used in forming the foundation as 
part of the process of adhering to the international standards. Goal 2.1 in this document states 
that, "Education shall be the right of every child regardless of ethnicity, culture, gender, 
religion and socio-economic status". Goal 2.4 states "Emphasis should be placed on girl's 
education in order to achieve equality of education". (SPLM 2002) 
While this was a good start, there continued to be gaps between the documents and real 
implementation amidst other challenges. Faced with the enormous responsibility of working 
towards uniting the education system in the south with limited resources and little or no 
capacity, the SOE also had the task of working to coordinate the NGOs already operating in the 
South using "their own style". Schools in different regions ran under different curricula based 
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on their proximity to their neighbors. Hence the curriculum became dependent on the NGOs 
implementing the program preference and from availability of books from the bordering 
countries. 
Before the peace deal was signed, pockets of war continued to plague the country. SPLM did 
not have the resources or the capacity needed to plan and implement its education strategy plan 
and relied on International donors and NGOS for resources and implementation. Very few 
people in south Sudan knew of the policy or had even seen it and most based on their 
geographical locations followed the curriculums of neighboring countries. Despite the fact the 
NGOs implementing education had been operating since the famine, a survey done in 2003 by 
UNICEF showed that only 25% of the children were enrolled in schools and 1 % of the girls 
enrolled completed primary school. Students had to walk for hours to school and most schools 
were under trees or in makeshift classrooms. Despite these challenges SPLM education system 
operated under the Secretariat of Education, continued to insist on International organizations 
collaborating with them to ensure coordination of efforts and activities followed the written 
policy. As more NGOs became involved, more meetings were held and the Education 
Reconstruction and Development Forum (ERDF) officially established as one way of 
coordinating the NGOS and the SOE. The main objective of this forum was to coordinate the 
multitude of various NGOs claiming to be operating in education so as to ensure mainly equity 
in terms of regions of operation and quality. As a way of ensuring control and avoiding being 
usurped by the NGO world the SOE wanted to find out who was doing what, where and the 
resources available. The SOE raised a concern that "most of the partner activities were not 
known to them and the need for addressing coordination issues. (ERDF minutes, 2005 Sept at 
Rumbek). 
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Statement of the problem 
Characteristic of conflict and post conflict settings, humanitarian crisis such as war and other 
natural or man-made catastrophes attract different interventions from a variety of places. South 
Sudan was no different. The civil war and human catastrophe has attracted International actors 
who are involved in implementing programs in all sectors. The intentions of these organizations 
vary in intention and hence the mode of operation. Overtime the planned programs evolve from 
talks and acts of relief and humanitarian assistance to reconstruction and rebuilding. Given that 
the Organizations operate under different mandates, responding to different needs often times 
to the same communities, the challenge and hence the need to coordinate at different levels has 
been seen as not only important but paramount in by many of these actors. One article states 
coordination challenges as one of the problems faced in implementing education in post-
conflict education and continues to state that complexity involved between the boundary that 
exists within education of humanitarian action and development contributes to the "plethora of 
coordination mechanisms." (Buckland, 2006) 
Initial involvements in South Sudan by International actors were relief, based on humanitarian 
responses. The Bahrl-el Ghazal famine in 1988 that attracted media and international pressure 
led to the formation of OLS in 1989 as a tripartite agreement between the SPLM, the GOS and 
the UN that would help coordinate the flow of humanitarian assistance to the needy civilians. 
(Deng, 2000). Different International organizations based on their mandates and beliefs, 
operated in different regions and worked as long as there was peace and funding permitted. 
Different actors were involved in implementing education programs in the best way they knew 
how, hence in different ways and with minimal efforts to coordinate their work. Interventions 
then, can be characterized as scattered, uncoordinated and in most cases duplicated efforts were 
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seen. This poor coordination of programs increased the challenge of working within this 
environment, created a gap in clarity of goals and roles and hence duplication of efforts in some 
areas and a gap in others. Later on as semblance of peace were seen in pockets areas, the jargon 
changed to include development and reconstruction and the need by different International 
NGO to coordinate was paramount. In preparation for peace, the SPLM government's ministry 
of education stmted demanding from these organizations for accountability, who was where 
doing what. While it sounds like a simple undertaking, this was not easy. 
Driven by different needs, expectations and demands, collision of interests of the different 
actors involved, causes lack of clarity and ultimately negatively impact the success of 
programs. Historical formation and practices of the different actors' further compounds the 
problems where changes need to occur and different way of operation has to be enacted. 
Changes brings more challenges uncertainty and is non-linear, (Fullan, 1999) hence the need to 
reconsider how others work and work together. Implementing actors who were historically 
formed and operated to offer relief services had to reconsider and learn how to operate within 
the relief and development jargon so as to survive, hence compounding the need to and the 
challenge in coordination. 
Using a case study of the Community girl's school, a Non Formal program implemented in 
south Sudan, the author will address practical coordination challenges that are faced by 
different actors working in Post- conflict scenarios and how these affect program 
implementation. Do all partners and actors within a program have the same understanding of 
the programs they are involved in and what it means to coordinate? Do all have the same or at 
least clear roles of what coordination efforts will be involved resources required and 
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responsibilities each is to carry? These are sme of the questions that the author will try to 
explore and examine the missed opportunities that arise when there is lack of clarity at the 
onset and continuation of implementing education programs. This study will look at the 
challenges that arise from these demands and how these may have negative effects on the very 
programs that are being implemented. While coordination issues in South Sudan were complex 
and vast, the study will concentrate on coordination issues within one program as a microcosm 
of the complexity involved in coordination issues. 
The study will examine the envisioned roles of the concerned actors involved, their 
objectives, the planned and actual roles they played and the coordination efforts within the 
program that was implemented and how that contributed towards the overall impact of the 
program. In doing so, I hope to contribute towards the dialogue on coordination in post-
conflict settings. 
Objectives of the study 
In this study, I hope to look at practical coordination issues and how these affect 
implementation of programs. The study aims to: 
• Analyze coordination efforts between agencies and the practical challenges that they 
• 
• 
encounter 
Analyze lessons that can be drawn in regards to coordination and partnership using the 
case study 
Propose strategies that need to be considered before and during the implementation of 
programs by multiple players. 
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Methodology 
This research is based on an in-depth case study that analysis the author's field experience 
combined with content analysis from data from the field. The analysis was carried out using 
relevant primary data from the field that includes reports from the field to the donors and to 
the SOE officials, minutes of various relevant coordination meetings that are recorded. Email 
conversations and discussions concerning the CGS have also been used in some cases to show 
the flow of information as used in the field. 
Interviews: Conversations and interviews with 6 field personnel involved with the programs 
at various levels were also be used to describe the meetings and complement the recorded 
minutes. The interviewees include one representative from the key organizations working 
with CGS in South Sudan between the periods of 2002-2006. This includes officials from 
UNICEF, SBEP, CIE-UMASS, and the County Education officers as the government 
representatives. Given the different level of involvement, different questions were used to 
provide relevant information that the participants were involved in. The interviews add to the 
general issues of coordination discussed by describing where necessary specific roles played 
by different actors. A desk analysis was involved in critically looking at the different reports 
that have been published on the Internet and any available sources by the organizations 
involved in the program that pertains to the organization history and mandates and their role 
in the program. 
One challenge of writing this study is that there is not so much study that has been written that 
can be drawn upon on the challenges involved in coordination of actors in education in post 
conflict. Most of the information given states coordination as a challenge but very few sources 
18 
go to depth of defining the issues, coordination activities or even the challenges involved. 
Given this challenge, the choice of analytical method will largely draw on concepts and 
historical data available from different organization. Another challenge is the fact that the 
field of post conflict education is evolving and there is sometimes not sufficient data 
available. Tracking down personnel who worked on the program has been difficult due to 
communication problems and the facts that some of them no longer work for the organization, 
hence very few interviews were done. Using previous records and the author's experience 
compensated this for this gap. Analysis of data and the choice of analysis will be drawn from 
comparing the different actor's roles as envisioned and as practiced and description of their 
work 
Author's role 
The role of the author in this study is important to consider and cannot be ignored in that the 
author was key program personnel of the Community Girls schools for three years. I served 
initially as the Community Girls School's training coordinator and later as the program 
manager for the Alternative Education System of which the CGS was one of the programs I 
managed and was involved in from its early beginnings. 
The program was fairly new when I joined and I was privileged to have been involved 
throughout the whole process of setting up the schools, negotiating with different community 
groups, and the County Education Officers and key education officials from the SPLM/SPLA. 
Over all I helped in the start-up of 26 schools, work with community to hire 52 teachers and 
supervised the 6 field education officers. I also worked with the curriculum team to develop 
the CGS curriculum and the textbooks, training of teachers and the supervisors (Field 
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Education Officers) and finally to handing the schools over to the communities three and a 
half years later. Part of the management issues involved coordinating with different actors at 
different levels, the donors, the NGO partners and the education officials for different reasons 
from day to day running of the schools or technical issues such as curriculum writings or in 
meetings and discussions held over the programs. I do have in depth knowledge on the 
program and issues involved that I find very useful and relevant intend to use to contribute 
towards this study. 
I do acknowledge the challenge involved in trying to remain objective given my role in the 
program and as the author. However I cannot ignore the experience gained and learned from 
my involvement in the program through observation and reflection that has helped to shape 
much of the discussions and examples used in the study. As much as possible the author has 
tried to remain objective by sticking to the relevant documents and reports that were written 
and interviews where relevant. Efforts will be made to reduce personal bias from the findings. 
In some cases where the author has stated her position, reflections and opinions, the pronoun 
(I) will be used or italicized so as to distinguish between her voice and those of others in the 
study. It is hoped that my personal reflection and experience will used to provide information 
in this area of study as it has been enriched and informed further through my understanding of 
the critical issues that come out from the study. 
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CHAPTER2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
We, the governments, organizations, agencies, groups and associations, represented at the 
World Education Forum pledge ourselves to: 
5. meet the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural calamities and 
instability and conduct educational programmes in ways that promote mutual 
understanding, peace tolerance, and that help to prevent violence and conflict. 
(World Education Forum, 2000, p.8) 
Education Role in Post-Conflict settings 
Education plays a unique and complex role both during and after conflict. Previously, 
education was not seen and included in humanitarian efforts as a basic need even though it is 
one sector of the social services that survives in different forms and usually attracts different 
responses, attentions and has earned international recognition. In the recent years, Education is 
now seen as a core social service response in conflict and post-conflict endeavors. Even after 
vast devastation of infrastructure and system collapse, research demonstrates that schools in 
different forms are one of the first social institutions that can be seen to operate. (World Bank, 
2005). This resilience may be reflected in continued schooling even within the challenges of 
equity, access and quality that continue to be seen during the post conflict scenarios. On the 
other hand, the relationship between education and conflict has also been described as 
'complex and multidirectional' (World Bank 2007, p. 2). Recent finding in articles now show 
that education has the capacity to play both the role of exacerbating conflict or of contributing 
towards peace building and development, for example through instilling values, skills and 
attitudes that promote peace and reduce conflict (Smith & Vaux, 2003) Education is seen as a 
key instrument that can lead to development and conflict seen as "development in reverse" ( 
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World bank, 2005 pg. 8). and a threat to achieving the EF A and MDG goals attest to this. In 
Post -conflict settings, it would seem that efforts are geared towards minimizing the risk of not 
achieving these goals and actors are forever in search of looking for ways to accelerate the 
growth and development that is needed towards achieving these goals. This has led not just to 
an increase in the number of programs working in Post-conflict but are also driven by a 
common genre of language as well that supports their presence. 
The complex relationship of education in conflict and post conflict scenarios has elicited a lot 
of International response from different actors and justifies international involvement especially 
during crisis. A report to DFID (Smith and Vaux. 2003) examined and established three 
perspectives that consider the relationship between education and conflict. The rights-approach, 
the development approach and education as a problem and solution approach. These 
perspectives not only ground why international actors are involved but the demand and 
challenges within the core issues brings out the challenges involved in coordination issues. 
The first core issues is that education is seen as a fundamental human right as written and 
ratified by many nations as commitments in various international instruments such as the UN 
convention on the right of the child (1989). This perspective is also emphasized in the EF A 
goals where "the rights for all people to benefit from an education that meets their basic needs" 
(goal 4) ... and as "a fundamental human right, key to sustainable development and peace and 
stability ... and hence indispensable means for effective participation" (goal 6) Dakar 2000 pg 
8) was reaffirmed. This means that, even in the most difficult times, countries and nations are 
committed to doing their best in providing education services on the basis of the rights 
approach. This rights approach perspective has been criticized within conflict and post conflict 
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settings as it is seen to pose a problem of sequencing or prioritizing among other human rights. 
The rights approach is seen to compete for priority (Smith and Vaux, 2003, p.14) and assumes 
that situations will be similar in all contexts. Should the right to eliminating poverty come first 
or education or the right of freedom? Given that each conflict and post conflict situation is 
different, and requires systemic analysis and response, sometimes education as a human right 
does not always come as a first priority. In his book Development as freedom, (1999) Amartya 
Sen (1999) introduces rather the term freedom in 'capability approach' where education creates 
the freedom that those being educated can exercise. The approach is currently used by UNDP 
but not popular in international circles. (Smith &Vaux 2003) 
Education as an essential tool to human development and poverty reduction is the second 
perspective as proposed in the Millennium development goals, where the role of education in 
eliminating poverty is echoed especially in one goal that refers to "the achievement of universal 
primary education by 2015" (MDG ... ). The issue of conflict and the role in education to 
achieve the EF A goals was discussed at a World education strategic forum in a session on 
Education in situations of emergencies and crisis (Nov 2000). This forum helped to highlight 
the need to give support needed for rapid progress towards EF A goals to countries in conflict 
and post conflict. 
Education according to these goals is seen to play an important role in not just reducing conflict 
but in helping in the reconstruction of post conflict countries. The declaration framework for 
action further states that, 'countries in conflict or undergoing reconstruction should be given 
special attention to building up their educational systems" (Dakar framework for action, p.9 
paragraph 14.). While these are good policies and well articulated the practical aspects of 
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meeting these commitments and goals are not clear, for example, what qualifies special 
attention and what kind of special attention is needed? Who is to provide and monitor, on what 
mandate and the list of questions keeps going on. These goals also tend to be quantitative and 
focus a lot on numbers rather than the quality of learning that takes place. I staking place. The 
increase in number of pupils in class may not necessary mean that learning is taking place, and 
even when learning is taking place the kind of learning that The MDG goals relates the 
positives of education to bring economic development and poverty reduction but does not 
realize the fact that education can also indeed be a cause of and increase conflict such as 
cultural repression of minorities, segregated education and others. (Saltarelli & Bush, 2000). 
The third perspective mentioned is the impact education can have where education is seen as 
part of the problem as well as part of the solution. Education implementers can no longer look 
at education as all good but have to start looking critically at education as a source of conflict 
as well. In many cases, education is a political and social tool (Smith and Vaux, 2003) and can 
be used to manipulate, subordinate or discriminate hence causing violence or conflict. "If this is 
the case, care should be taken in analyzing resource contribution and issues of quality. 
The role that education plays cannot be overstated and the reason why so many actors are 
involved is understandable. In conflict and post conflict situations, intervention from 
international arena is imperative especially based on fundamental goals ratified internationally 
and are used as the basis for policy making in many nations. While these interventions are 
meant to be helpful, the demands and pressures to implement programs can also be sources of 
challenges in coordination efforts. Well meaning programs and projects if uncoordinated and 
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can indeed proceed to "cause harm". How then do different organizations define some of these 
terms? 
Definition of terms 
To be able to better understand the issues we are dealing with I will continue to look at a 
variety of definitions of the two main terms that flow throughout the study and define the 
working definition that I will be using in this study. The purpose is two-fold, first is to give a 
background of how different literatures define and understand the context hence the setting. 
Secondly look at the impact in terms of application if any of how these definitions goes to set 
stage and justify implementation of programs in regards to coordination. What and how has 
post-conflict and coordination been defined and how does that affect the way things are done? 
Post conflict 
While the term post conflict has been used extensively in a host of the many literatures that I 
came across, defining the term was not quite clear and proved to be problematic, obscure and 
has been evolving over time. Most of the definitions tended to describe the elements of 
characteristics that can be found within post-conflict situations and even the application of 
these tend to vary and differ from context and situations. Let's take a look at a few of these 
definitions 
"Post conflict is defined 
1. " ... as the period when hostilities have abated to the level where some reintegration and 
recovery can begin .... acute humanitarian crisis has ended and a process of reintegration and 
political and economic recovery has begun ... " (Forman & Salomons, 1999). 
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2. The UN charter that commits member's state to "create conditions of stability and well 
being" and "promote higher standards of living" sets the concept of post-conflict.( UN 
Charter article 47-56,1995) 
3. ' .... generally commences with the signature of peace accords and lasts until a degree of 
political normalcy is restored typically from two to five years. The description continues to 
acknowledge the unique contextual attributes and recovery and states that it involves a "triple 
transition" from war to peace; from controlled market to a market economy; and from 
authoritarianism (or totalitarianism) to democracy." (Patrick, 1998) 
4. "Post-conflict reconstruction starts when hostilities end, typically in the form of a cease-fire 
agreement or peace agreement. ... is designed to assist in stabilizing the peace process and 
prevent relapse into conflict ... but its ultimate aim is to address the root causes ofa conflict 
and to lay thefoundationsfor social justice and sustainable peace." (NEPAD, 2005. p.g. 6) 
the paper continues to give the three phases that post conflict systems proceeds through 
namely, the emergency phase, transition phase and the development phase." 
5. Other articles characterize post conflict countries as "countries emergingfrom conflict" and 
delineate these as countries in which there are a reasonable expectation of peace, or an 
actual peace agreement .. . a continuum from "ongoing conflict to peace settlement, 
reconstruction and post reconstruction. "(Vaux & Visman, 2005, 8, 13) 
The above examples suggest that the definition of post conflict is time based and on a 
continuum after considerable hostilities have ended. The continuum tries to describe the 
relationship that exists from chaos to progress towards development and reconstruction. Most 
of the descriptions also state the need for some form of agreement between the rival groups or 
some agreement towards some semblance of peace. The descriptions also seem to carry the 
connotations of stability or working towards stability. These complications of trying to describe 
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or define the terms have been evolving with the current trend and term used today as "fragile 
states." In this study, we shall stay with the term post-conflict. 
The problem with the definitions is that they are too optimistic and assumes that reconstruction 
will move towards a certain orderly step. The realities, uncertainty and volatile nature have 
proved over time that conflicts can be unpredictable and take a longtime such as Somalia. 
While they do accept contextual difference, the descriptions are too linear. Success is also tied 
in to political stability that ties in with market economy. The implication is that implementation 
of programs is based on these definitions and determines how operations are run. The challenge 
however comes in where different donors prioritize different things based on their definition. 
NEP AD for example may prioritize addressing the root problems while the UN may be more 
concerned about standards. While this diversity has its positives, it can also cause challenges of 
implementation at field level. Implementing programs in post conflict settings involves careful 
considerations and certain key issues need to be taken into consideration. 
In this paper, I recognize that post-conflict does not mean that there is total absence of conflict 
rather as a state or time within a process towards peace. (Patrick, 1998) I will define post-
conflict as a country where there is relative security that allows reconstruction of any kind to 
take place beyond humanitarian relief, which allows political and economic reforms to take 
place and one that has a recognized leadership including that of non-state actors. This also 
includes the acceptance by the local community to invest their time and resources towards the 
process as a sign of stability. 
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Coordination 
Coordination issues continue to remain a paradox. Most actors agree to not just the need and 
value of coordination on one hand but in many cases continue to carry out programs in isolated 
uncoordinated pockets, and continue to cite coordination as a challenge. People talk about it. 
Indeed, a peruse through most of the post-conflict reports, often times cites or alludes to lack of 
coordination at different levels as a challenge. Lack of coordination has been cited as one of the 
three critical challenges and failure of NGOs (Bennet, 1994). Donors despite their coordinates 
they impose with aid want to know how well their resources are being spent as there are 
accountable to their contributors. While accepting aid on one hand, governments or non-state 
actors in affected areas are concerned about the delivery modes of the aid, control issues, 
political agendas they may have, among others from the mammoth of Organization agencies 
during and after crisis. Then of course we have the recipient at community level, who have to 
deal with different agencies demands and requests for different things and have learnt to juggle 
along these demands. Of course we cannot forget the NGO's who are concerned of the donor 
demands as well as trying to do as much as they can in the best way they know how and try to 
stay at the top of the game. It is like a serious game of survival. Just because they agree to 
educations role in post-conflict or are tied to the global goals does not mean that they have the 
best-coordinated plans. (Sommers, 2000) 
Several literatures have defined coordination from various perspectives. While there was a lot of 
literature that talks about or mentions coordination, there is not an agreed upon definition to draw 
from. It was hard to choose which definition to use for this study. A few definitions will be 
reviewed. The lack of a clear definition of what coordination means may present problems of 
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those involved in coordination to know what they are coordinating and how to go about it. Let's 
look at a few examples that stood out 
1. One defines coordination based on how well resources are utilized "Coordination is in sum 
the optimal use of resources and the optimal accountability for them." 
(Donini, Antonio, 1996) 
2. He goes further to look at definition based on several instruments and how well those 
instruments are monitored and defines coordination as 
"the systematic utilization o.f policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive 
and effective manner. Such instruments include: (1) strategic planning; (2) gathering data and 
managing information; (3) mobilizing resources and assuring accountability; (4) orchestrating a 
functional division of labor in the field; (5) negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework 
with host political authorities; and (6) providing leadership. Sensibly and sensitively employed, 
such instruments inject an element of discipline without unduly constraining action. 
(Donini, 1996. p.g .... 
The above two definitions looks at various operational concepts that needs to be looked from a 
policy level and assumes a rather top-down approach where one entity be it a person or 
organization, takes the responsibility to see how something somewhere else will be clone through 
provision of good leadership ... It assumes that if we have good policy that works and is used, then 
coordination will provide effective assistance and protection to vulnerable populations. This is all 
part of rhetoric as policy alone not accompanied by strategic action may take a long time to work 
if at all. The lack of involving others in the definition, where coordination is something done for 
another, usually the vulnerable tends to bring out hegemonic tendencies. 
Other than definitions, coordination has also been classified and clustered in various ways. Some 
literature classifies it according to functions and is seen to be either strategic and or technical if. 
Strategic coordination is defined here as the coordination that looks at the leadership and 
clarification of roles of the humanitarian organizations and all other political leaders. Technical 
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coordination on the other hand looks at the actual running of programs. This binary classification 
serves to delineate rather than help in the coordination of the process where one is seen as 
separate from the other. It also assumes that if the strategic coordination is well laid out then 
technical/program coordination would also work out. The complex context in the filed does not 
allow this. 
The mammoth of literature on coordination is huge especially from a strategic coordination 
perspective. There have been strategies developed by the UN for the coordination purposes of 
the humanitarian wing. How well this has been done is still contested as the coordination 
challenge continues to be echoed in program reports. My argument however is not from a 
strategic coordination, but is more on the technical/program coordination on ground. Perhaps 
the problem is not that there is 'lack of coordination' as is often cited but that there is too much 
top heavy coordination and very little at program level 
Coordination Issues involved in implementing education in Post-conflict scenarios 
The challenges of working in post conflict countries are complex and vary from one country to 
another. Involved actors are concerned with the need for restoring peace, provision of basic 
amenities and needs and ensuring that human rights are respected so as to lead towards stability 
for the development of the country or nation. Aside these challenges and concerns 
characteristic in the rebuilding process or work towards recovering in post conflict settings, 
tensions between the different actors International actors and the host countries influences the 
relationships and operations in these context which further complicates implementation 
process. These tensions can be between the international agencies themselves or between 
International actors and host country actors at different level be it the community, governments 
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or the proxy governments/leaders which influences relationships and implementation of 
programs and ultimately complicating coordination efforts. 
In this section I have tried to broadly look at three key tension issues that all actors contend 
with in post-conflict settings and how these issues impact their coordination efforts. The first 
issue is based on provision of resources or financing, the second revolves around the issues of 
politics at various levels, who controls what and has the power over whom, and finally the 
practical technical program issues that have to be considered. In an education program, these 
include issues to do with training, curriculum, design of programs and so on. 
Financing tensions 
You do not insult the hand that feeds you. (Swahili saying) 
In post-conflict settings, financing the reconstruction processes is usually a priority to most 
actors. Different actors have to contend with the provision and utilization of resources for 
reconstruction and development. Tensions in resources are mainly three-fold, from the 
governments or non-state actors, from donors and different NGO's involved and from the 
communities. Careful considerations are undertaken when competing for resources so as not to 
insult the hand that feeds. 
In post-conflict settings, the priority is in taking advantage of the peace so as the process of 
rebuilding and reconstruction of systems and education is often times seen due to its resilience 
as a major factor that hastens the process ofreconstruction. (World Bank, 2005). That said, the 
lack of structures and systems including human personnel is a challenge for most donors as 
they require some sort of structure for accountability purposes. This means that in places such 
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as South-Sudan, funding is channeled through other organizations who take the responsibility 
to work with proxy-governments and provide the structure needed. 
Governments or None-state actors, emerging from conflict are concerned on how and where to 
get the resources they need for the reconstruction process without necessarily feeling that they 
are losing their autonomy. In many cases and for the above stated reasons, funding is usually 
channeled through other organizations and the governments or non-state actors are expected to 
work together. While this is often welcome the question of what the external sourcing of funds 
mean to a government's control in making policy versus the donor's pressure remains and 
hence the tension is unresolved. Even in cases where the donors expects the implementing 
partners to work with the governments or non-state actors, the hand that controls the purse is 
seen to rule and the bigger the purse, the tighter and bigger the control. The situation is further 
complicated in that each post-conflict context is different. Different actors in different settings 
have to come together and work out ways of prioritizing financial need and use for finances, 
address the question of availability of resources and the best use and management of those 
resources. What are the internal and external resources and how can those be made available 
and used? How can those resources be accessed and by who? Who takes the responsibility of 
accountability? Each step of the chain requires some accountability so as to report back, which 
also varies. A breakdown or delay in accountability chain may result to program delays and 
frustrations. Coordination of finances and or resources becomes very crucial and sensitive in 
such settings. 
Even where funding is provided, the development prospect, requires communities to contribute 
towards the development project. The argument here is that if communities contribute towards 
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the development project, then they are more likely to own it and be obligated to be responsible 
for the project. Unlike in humanitarian provision, where in most cases resources are provided, 
this is sometimes a big shift for many communities who on one hand are poor and were used to 
receiving aid and are now expected to contribute. The binary definition between development 
and humanitarian is vague especially for communities. When exactly do we say that we have 
moved from relief to development, who defines that and how does that get communicated. In 
most cases, it is not the communities. So one day the community wakes up and shift has 
occurred and they are usually informed by well meaning NGO's and their local counterparts, 
usually in well-planned community mobilization that they are now in development stage and 
are expected to contribute. Sitting in one of these meetings in South Sudan, I will always 
remember on old man very annoyed telling us to go tell "them" that sent us that they were still 
hungry poor, and had nothing to contribute. The Old man didn't see the difference between 
relief and development or when the shift occurred. 
While Education needs are in many contexts highly prioritized, it also has to compete with 
other social services and with other sectors such as security. (Ndaruhuste, 2004). Other than 
prioritizing, the sources of resources have to be considered. Reports indicate that even when 
funding is availed, resources allocated towards Education sector remains weak, are slowly 
disbursed and tied within rigid bureaucracy that often frustrates and complicates education 
reconstruction. In South Sudan for example, by May 2007, of the USD 91.9 million funding for 
education pledged, only USD 7.7 million (8.4%) had been "allocated. One recent report noted 
that "the funding of education fragmented, uncoordinated and at the mercy offading interests" 
(SCF report, 2007). On the other hand the donor community while willing to give is concerned 
with the cost-effectiveness use of the resources and accountability, especially in cases where 
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the capacity of the countries is not strong. In some cases especially in early reconstruction, 
funds is disbursed through International NGO's who are seen as having the capacity and 
capability to While the "demand" may prove weak and incapable, the "supply side" has its 
own challenges. Donors have been said to "repackage previously committed funds" (Patrick, 
1998). Aid comes with 'strings attached' and is sometimes given based on their own political 
ideals and fiscal interests or those of the nations they represent. This coupled with poor 
coordination among the various donors, their ability to allocate funds to whichever projects 
they choose within a 'tight-grip', delay in disbursement of funds all contribute towards the 
challenges of financing in post-conflict settings. While the saying Swahili saying that one 
should not abuse the hand that feeds it, it is also true that when there are many hands competing 
to feed the same mouth in uncoordinated way, the results may be a more frustrated unfed 
stomach unless the hands agree on how the feeding is to be done. 
Political tensions 
In discussing post-conflict politics, I will be looking at leadership issues based on who controls 
the various systems, be it the donor community the International NGOs and the community. 
The proliferation of programs and projects by different actors in conflict and post-conflict 
settings brings with it the issues of leadership and competition of control. During one of my 
trips to South Sudan, as we started our descent to land, a colleague of mine described the NGO 
compounds as small "governments" enclosed in their compounds with guards at the gate. 
While the statement may have been offered in jest, it got me thinking. The reality is that in their 
own small ways and unknowingly, the NGO's seemed to have created to themselves their own 
regions of operations within these spaces. Enclosed within the gates and walls were the NGOS 
politics and day-to-day protocols that governed them and others. To a large extent, the NGOs 
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control the resources and policies in conflict settings. The NGOs with the largest resources and 
programs, have a number of experience in terms of number of years, are seen as the 
organizations "in-charge" of the region. Even the small NGOs structure is in such ways that 
ultimately, work is done for a particular audience to please a particular entity alias the donor so 
as to ensure survival of the programs. Reports, decisions and resources are thus made and 
controlled "at a higher level" and usually in a different place. While I am not against this par se, 
I argue that, as the chain of transfer of power increases, the demand for better coordination 
should increase as well. 
Technical/Program issues 
By technical programming, I am looking at the day-to-day running the program issues, the 
content of the curriculum and the oversight of the whole program. Who makes the curriculum 
decisions, what is in the curriculum, how should the program look like, who is involved, who 
are the teachers and so on. Political issues, be it the politics among and between NGOs or the 
state providers usually affect the technical day to day program issues as well. For example, 
some programs may push towards the sector-wide approach, while another may decide that that 
is not relevant to their goals. This means that similar programs can have very different trainings 
based on the goals of the NGOs. One NGO may also look at the cost of implementation 
differently from another based on how much they have which may be different from another 
NGOs point of view and hence willingness to participate. Am I proposing for a uniform way of 
doing things? Not necessarily but that consideration of long term impact especially for 
sustainability purposes needs to take place. The over all goals and objectives ofNGOs should 
at least be based on the national goals of the setting. 
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Summary of Coordination challenges faced by implementing actors in post conflict countries 
Funding/ AID in post conflict education: 
• Funding initiatives in conflict and post conflict areas play major and defining roles in the 
way programs are implemented. While there is a lot of talk on sustainability of programs, 
implementation of programs to a large extent depends more on who the donors are and 
their mandates and expectations. One donor for example may only be willing to fund 
girls while another may be welcome to the flexibility of the context. NGOs are then left 
with the challenge of dealing with these constraints at the same time trying to compete 
for the resources. 
Defining the type of response and 
• Is it humanitarian/relief or development? The thin line that differentiates the two and 
the transition process may be clear to program developers' funders and policy maker 
but rarely is this well communicates with the people on ground. The terms hence remain 
a common jargon that NGO's use to a community members ears. On the other hand, 
this jargon of words has implication in terms of the length of funding and expectations 
to the communities and from donors. Most often these are not well communicated and 
understood and the community and the aid agencies are usually on two different 
footings, with the later, working hard to convince to former 
• Even when the Aid agencies understand the terms, there is usually the confusion or 
transition from one to the other-how do we transition? 
Overlapping mandate-Organizations histories and their mission 
• Who are the organizations and what do they represent. Historically some of these 
organizations are either relief based, or religious and this plays a role in how they 
operate, where they get their funding and how that affects the work in the field. For 
example, some organizations work as relief organizations mainly rooted in religious 
beliefs and the shift from development from relief becomes a challenge. 
Varying expectations and definition of roles 
• Every actor comes with expectations of what they intend to do and how and the game of 
convincing the other the best-laid plans begins. 
• NGOs see community as beneficiaries and not partners . 
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Ineffective oversight 
• Lack of capacity and limited control by the governments. NGOs being the funders call the 
shorts, everyone has a say in what is to be done and whoever controls the biggest pocket 
gets heard. 
• Un-discussed varying degrees of expectations by all the different actors. 
Global Initiatives in education (EF A, MDG,) 
• Global initiatives have played a major push towards countries and NGO's policies and 
implementation of programs as these affect the funding mechanism for different 
organizations. Examples, girl's education, EFA, MDGs, and the current issues on Fragile 
states. 
In the next chapter we shall begin addressing some of these challenges as experienced in the 
case study selected. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE CASE STUDY 
Analysis of the CGS in South Sudan 
In this chapter, we shall begin taking a closer look at the Community Girls School programs, 
here in referred to as CGS. I need to clarify that there were over 400 confirmed Community 
Girls' Schools operating between the years 2002-2006 (Ayite & Dabi 2006). However, some 
of the schools were not verified. During this period, the International NGO's with the help of 
the Secretariat of Education managed most of the schools. While the uniqueness of each 
region cannot be under pinned, the structure and management of the schools was generally the 
same. I have made several references to all the CGS schools operating during this period in 
south Sudan mainly due to its common unique qualities that operated in most of the schools. 
However, I need to clarify that while reference is made about all the schools, specific 
examples in some cases are mainly drawn from the cluster of schools that were managed 
under the Alternative/Non Formal Education within the USAID funded project the Sudan 
Basic Education Program (SBEP). This is based on the availability of data and familiarity of 
the specific schools. This chapter to a large extent, looks at the overall operation and 
management of the schools and actors involved and not the specific schools. Where special 
reference to specific schools will be used as examples to stress certain points, footnotes of the 
details will be provided. 
Rationale for Selecting the Case Study 
The decision to use the case study was derived from its unique characteristics of place, the 
timing, the actors involved and the already available data. To begin with the unique context 
and setting of the study is within a time period where the South Sudan was characterized as 
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Post-Conflict region, in preparation for transition. The schools were located in areas where 
there was relative safety under the proxy governance of the SPLM/SPLA. 
The schools as we shall see later were initiated by International organizations as a respond to 
education needs in a post-conflict setting. Hence the case study is an example of the 
alternative models that are used in post conflict settings so as to address various needs in 
education. Alternative programs have continued to be encouraged as a way of addressing 
issues of access, equity and quality in basic education in such settings and have become 
popular within the International NGO and other education actors. Given their flexibility, 
education is looked at from different angles by different actors using different goals and 
objectives. 
Other than its locations, there was a range of different actors involved from different donors, 
International organization, and the humanitarian wing under UNICEF and communities that 
varied from region to region. This also meant that the goals, objectives and methods of 
implementing differed. 
Finally resources were also availed from different channels, demanded for different reasons 
and used to a large extent differently. While there were insinuations of working together, the 
case study provides a perfect mixture of challenges involved in implementing programs by 
several actors in complex situations. Over time, we have seen many organizations coming 
together to work either in a consortium or in clusters or under big umbrellas such as the INEE. 
While these are important steps towards working together for mutual understanding, the 
challenges involved cannot be ignored. The aim of this case study is to bring out some of 
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these challenges that are experienced in such circumstances and perhaps provide some 
recommendations towards the need to reconsider coordination issues in implementing 
programs. 
Background and History of Establishing CGS in South Sudan 
Community Girls schools were seen as a key component of the Education Policy of the 
Secretariat of Education, that among other things strongly advocates for Education as the 
right of every child regardless of ethnicity, culture, and gender, religious and socio-economic 
status. Different assessment reports show that girls have been most affected by the war. Of the 
30% children enrolled in primary schools 26% were girls, a percentage that continues to 
decrease as one move to higher grades. (AET/UNICEF School baseline Assessment report 
2003). This led to several initiatives to try and bridge this gender gap. 
The first initiative was from UNICEF who proposed a visit to Bangladesh to see the BRAC 
School in 2000 by several officials from South Sudan. After the visit, the BRAC model was 
seen as an ideal model to borrow for the south Sudan setting as it was seen as a cheaper way 
to encourage the community to run schools and specifically address the girl's education 
problem. I need to point out here that while the idea of borrowing and learning from others 
may not be avoided for several reasons; the complexity of borrowing programs needs not to 
be ignored despite the "urgency" used in justifying rushed programs. For example, in 
borrowing BRAC for the south Sudan context, question such as: what makes the BRAC 
model thrive in Bangladesh? What support mechanisms are in place for support systems, 
management, finances and how would it differ in a place like south Sudan? What difference 
would it make to do without or have different support system, how would that look like and 
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most importantly who would take responsibility of not just initial financing but offering 
support system as well? 
Rationale for estahnishing the CGS in south Sudan 
With an approximate of 1.6 million south Sudanese children out of school due to the conflict 
setting, lack of infrastructure, girls are the most affected. Access to schools due to distance, 
lack of infrastructure, cultural practices such as early marriages and the need for girls 
especially to work at home were factors among many that the girls have to contend with. The 
latest report done by MOEST and UNICEF shows that despite efforts by many International 
NGOS, this situation has not really improved. The Rapid Assessment of Leaming Spaces 
(RALS 2006) done by UNICEF and MOEST shows that out of the 758,207 students enrolled 
in 2922 learning spaces, 34% are girls and only 1 % of these girls complete their primary 
education.(RALS report. 2006. pg 6-7). Students have to travel distances ranging from 2. 7km 
to 6. 9kms depending on the region (pg 41 ). With such dismal figures, all efforts for 
alternatives to education are welcome. 
Policy dimensions The Secretariat of Education (SOE) official representatives who visited 
the BRAC School so liked the program that they decided to adapt it to the south Sudanese 
context. This led to the establishment of the first schools by UNICEF in the Bahr -el-Ghazal 
region in 2001. The officials believed the model was relevant, cheap and suitable for the south 
Sudanese context and created a department within its structure for the CGS establishment. 
The Secretariat believed in these schools and the program to address on of their Education 
goals which states that, "Education shall be right of all children and shall not be discriminated 
upon by gender, region or ethnicity." (SOE unpublished doc). CGS came to be referred to as 
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"the SOE baby". Given that the SOE did not have the resources available, the mandate to 
implement was left to the International organizations. By the year 2005, mainly UNICEF and 
Sudan Basic Education Program as the International NGO's with the support of the SOE 
facilitated COS programs. Later UNICEF subcontracted to other NGOs for implementation. 
By 2005, there were more than 252 community girls' schools were established in Bahr-el-
Ghazal, Western Equatorial and Upper Nile regions. A total of 8102 children were enrolled, 
(98% girls), 278 teachers trained and 53 Field education officers assisting in the support of the 
teachers. (Ayite & Dabi report). The organizations relied on the communities for the success 
of the schools and a lot of community mobilizations efforts had to be put in place to sell the 
idea to the communities and get them involved. 
The establishment of the community girl's schools has the full support and recognition of the 
ministry. Local authorities and the communities are involved in mapping out and selecting the 
villages and sites for the schools. The ministry officials oversee and approve the curriculum 
developed by a group of Sudanese led by a consultant hired by the secretariat but paid by 
SBEP and UNICEF. The NGOs provides a humble one-time grant of 200 US dollars for 
school to support the initial constructions and does all the capacity building and training. 
Coordination meetings are held at least thrice a year between the government and the NGOs. 
Reporting is mainly the NGOs responsibility. However, very little is done by the ministry to 
ensure quality of the schools. The NGOs are limited by financial constraint and their visions. 
Management of the schools is left to the communities who are poor and stretched. 
Ideological dimension One may wonder why in a place like south Sudan, where 
reconstruction and development was in the process there needs to be a COS. Why not just 
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build formal schools? Why girls alone and not boys? Are boys not part of the "all" in the 
Education for all goals? These were some contentious issues that created basis for discussions 
and debates with different groups. In some places the communities allowed a certain 
percentage of boys in the schools even though the schools were meant solely for girls. The 
unique opportunities and element of choice given to the communities is one of the unique 
characteristics of the formal schools. Previous history of an authoritarian regime where 
schools had to follow the set system, down to prescribing Arabic as a language, the 
opportunity to decide was seen as empowering. 
The CGS model was designed to equip the girls with basic literacy skills and thus empower 
and prepare the girls for the future .The model more or less falls under the disadvantage 
paradigms as described by Rogers (2004).Though the NGOs are the implementers, not much 
was budgeted for the schools as they were labeled "cost effective" by the SOE officials and 
the NGOS at the beginning. SBEP for example, saw its major role in supporting the 
communities to establish the schools by building the capacity of the community and teachers. 
Communities were expected to be self-reliant, manage and run the schools using the locally 
available resources. This however did not work very well and contributed to the challenges 
faced as we shall see later. Too much expectation and support drained the communities that 
were used to educational services being provided fro free and while they were eager to do 
their part, keeping up this motivation amidst poverty and other demands proved to be a 
challenge. The MOEST on the other hand controls the schools by recognizing and creating 
room for alternative approaches to addressing diverse educational needs and is also in charge 
of overall monitoring through the County education centers. It also monitors NGOs that are 
implementing and structuring the curriculum. However, the ministry allows spaces for 
43 
communities to make decisions, recruit teachers locally and adapt the use of mother tongue 
among others. 
Analysis of the Learning Environment 
In his book "teaching with the brain in mind" 2005, Jensen discusses the effect the physical 
environment has on students. Issues to do with space, seating arrangement, light among other 
things can and do affect the brain and learning. In designing the CGS, issues such as space, 
distance and seating arrangement were considered as described below. In this section, we 
shall take a closer look at some of these conditions necessary to learning, such as the 
environment, financing, and management. 
Physical Structure: One of the roles of the community was to provide a learning space and 
construct a one-roomed class with locally available resources. This was one way that the 
implementing NGOs saw as a crucial strategy for the communities to own the schools. 
Despite efforts to work with the community to provide a one-room structure, construction and 
maintenance continued to be a challenge. 
The communities either were stretched 
too thin by other activities to afford a one 
roomed structure, or given their previous 
experiences where schools were the 
responsibility of the government did not 
see it as part of their responsibility to 
build schools, especially given that it was for girls. In some cases there were no schools 
available for several miles and the community argued for a better bigger school in the name of 
development even if it was to be for girls only rather than a one roomed structure. The idea of 
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a temporary structure or a semi-permanent structure did not sell. To the community members, 
the visibility of a brick constructed school meant true development. Hence in some cases, 
classes continued to be conducted under trees and classes postponed during the rainy seasons. 
This also meant that there were no places to display learning materials or store them and 
eventually the teachers gave up making them. The metal boxes provided by SBEP to store 
classroom materials ended up in many cases stored in teachers' homes and eventually 
disappeared. 
Proximity to school and Flexibility of Time For parents to accept to send their girls to 
school, the environment had to offer a sense of safety in terms of distance and convenience. 
Parents were not comfortable to send their small girls to schools not only because of the 
insecurity on the way but most of them felt that it was a waste of precious time when the girls 
could have been at home doing other chores. The proximity of the school meant that the girls 
were near and would be home after three hours. The community discussed and decided on the 
timings. Some schools started early mornings while others chose the afternoon sessions. 
Timing in some schools would also change especially during the rainy seasons and harvest 
times. The flexibility to the time when the school would take place meant that the girls had a 
block and of time where they could learn uninterrupted. 
Locally recmited Teachers and training: the community selects Teachers with at least a 
grade six education, preferably female and married, from the locality. In Western Equatorial 
region, SBEP and the communities agreed to have two teachers rather than one per school. 
Selection of the teachers by the community meant that the parents choose someone familiar 
whom they felt comfortable to entrust their girls to and who usually was someone more 
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learned than majority in the community and hence a role model for the girls. In most cases the 
teachers had not been trained. They went through a basic introductory training course for two 
weeks and met once a month with other teachers for refresher trainings. Teachers were also 
supported with basic allowance of 15usd per month paid by the NGO. Supervision of teachers 
was by the community and the Field education officers who were trained to assist the teachers 
with technical teaching issues such as day to day classroom management and lessons they had 
difficulty in. the FEO's were to visit each school at least twice a week. Distance between 
each school and weather made this impractical. Given that their communities locally selected 
the teachers most of them felt a sense of duty to their community and the girls and were hence 
usually very motivated despite the continuous everyday challenges they faced. The fact that 
they had to report to their own people made them feel responsible, dedicated and innovative. 
The fact that they were not certified trained teachers also meant that they valued the time they 
shared with their supervisors and with each other. This continuous flow of feedback between 
the teachers and the Field education supervisors and the community helped to structure the 
training needs held monthly to deal with major issues. 
Students and assessment: Each community school was structured to have 30 girls aged 7-11 
years old. This was discussed with the community and the criteria agreed upon. The U-shaped 
seating arrangement was recommended as seen in the BRAC model. In cases where they had 
too many children, the class was always spilt into two to create space. Teachers are 
encouraged to continually assess the learners in class and give feedback. The teachers 
developed most assessments. With automatic promotion to the next grade, the teachers 
learned to see assessment as a way of providing feedback to the girls and their parents and not 
a way of selecting out students. This helped to promote cooperative learning where learners 
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worked together and teachers helped individual students who had difficulties. This was not 
automatic but a result of a process from training with teachers and the Field Education 
Officer. 
CGS Curriculum and provision of learning materials: Given that the Secretariat was in 
favor of the schools, curriculum issues were seriously considered and given priority. A 
consultant was hired from Kenya, to help in designing and developing a culturally appropriate 
curriculum. The curriculum was based on the New Sudan primary school curriculum and 
accelerated to cover four years of education in three. Life-skills issues identified by the SOE 
were to be incorporated. The rationale was to equip the girls with important life skills they 
would find useful if for some reasons they were not able to continue into primary schools. 
Issues such as peace education and conflict resolution, HIV I AIDS, health education and 
proper nutrition were incorporated. Instructional teaching and learning materials for the 
learners were also provided and teachers trained to use and make learning materials such as 
cloth calendars, pictures and others materials that they thought would help and also to make 
teaching and learning materials from the environment. 
Preparatory Phase; When the schools began, there was a preparatory phase for two months. 
The girls and the teachers used this time to orient the girls to the idea of being in school. 
During this time basic writing skills through drawings on the ground with sticks, story telling, 
games songs and counting using sticks and seeds were part of the curriculum. The objective 
of the simulations, exploration games and the use of locally available materials as 
manipulative were to promote cooperative learning and create a safe space for the girls to 
learn. Books and writing materials were introduced after the two months even though many 
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people, including the parents and the teachers, would have wanted to have the materials 
earlier. 
Training: Training of teachers was a crucial component of the CGS. Initially teachers were 
given two weeks intensive short orientation training and thereafter-monthly refresher 
trainings. These were meant to serve as meeting points, training and reflective times for all the 
teachers within a given region. However very little reflection was done and a lot of time was 
spent on management and problem solving issues. The idea of reflective practice being 
foreign was hardly ever practiced and over time was forgotten. 
During the training active learning and learner centered practices were introduced and 
emphasized continuously to the teachers. In reality however, the gap between what happened 
in training sessions and in class continued to be seen. Teachers continuously struggled with 
what they had always known or were taught in and the "new ways' of teaching was totally 
foreign to them and hard to envision. Previous behaviorist ways of teachings, that most 
teachers had been taught in and knew, where the teacher was the informer and the good 
student the silent recipient, was hard to do away with. Teachers, who had previous teaching 
experience, had an even harder time in trying to use learner centered practices. As one 
consultant observed, 
"Despite the emphasis in the training on interactive teaching methods and child-centered 
activities, and the provision of materials such as a cloth 'wall calendar', the lessons observed 
were traditional blackboard work; the teacher wrote on the blackboard and had the students 
copy into their exercise books." (Jackie Kirk consultants report 2004). 
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Classroom management and discipline The seating arrangement was mostly U-shaped or in 
small groups under trees. The presence of the small girls with their baby sisters or brothers on 
their backs or somewhere nearby in class made class management a tricky issue. This being a 
common practice, teachers had to learn to teach the girls despite the occasional interruption of 
babies crying. It was worth noting however how the children would cooperate to help keep 
the babies together and tend them together as learning continued. Discipline was hardly an 
issue as teachers and the pupils all knew each other. This was coupled with the cultural 
imbedded ideas of who the teacher is in the eyes of the child and the society, as the figure in 
front with a stick or some sort of authority. A teacher became more respected if they could 
make learners keep quiet with just a look or command some sort of respect and awe. While it 
is worth noting that corporal punishment was not common, punishment either verbally or 
embarrassing was not unusual. In most cases children feared being reported to their parents. 
Culturally the children having grown up with the idea of who a teacher is in the eyes of the 
society accorded that respect. 
Despite these challenges the fact that the teachers were selected by the communities and well 
known by the children and the parents and vice versa worked well to reduce what I would call 
the student- teachers fear factor 
The friendly environment was in many cases a boost especially where the teachers were 
women. 
Analysis of the Support Environment 
The importance of having a support system in alternative programs cannot be 
overemphasized. Indeed, it is one of the many reasons often attributed to the success of 
BRAC community schools. This has been accomplished by ensuring success through 
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providing a service delivery mechanism, community technical support, details to management 
issues and provision of finance. (EQUIP 2. pg. 2. 2006.) 
For South Sudan, different support mechanism structures had to be put in place so as to 
ensure that the schools continued to operate. Here we shall take a closer look at the different 
support mechanisms provided for these schools. 
Staffing, Supervision and Monitoring As the NGOS implementing and funding most of the 
activities of the CGS, UNICEF and SBEP supervised the school directly and reported to 
MOEST. The community recruited the teachers, who were paid by UNICEF or SBEP and the 
County Education Officer and the NGO involved interviewed and recruited the Field 
Education Officer. The role of the FEO's was to supervise at least 5- 8 schools. The main 
role of the FEO's was to mentor and train teachers. Other roles included working together 
with the SMC's in supervising and managing the schools. To enable FEO's performed their 
duties effectively, they had to undergo a management training organized by the NGO's. A 
total of 53 FEO's were trained. It is important to note here that the FEO's were a crucial link 
between the girls' schools, the communities through the SMC's, the education administration 
(the County education centers) and the NGOs. The FEO's often sat in the committee meetings 
and with time the teachers and the community members saw the FEO's as part of their school. 
This relationship created a free environment where issues were openly discussed and acted on 
or referred where need be. 
The role of the community Given that these schools were structured to be managed by the 
communities, the role of communities in establishing the CGS was emphasized during 
community mobilizations done by the International Organizations responsible. The schools 
were marketed as Community owned schools with minimal support from implementing NGO. 
50 
To begin with, different members of communities were asked to volunteer learning spaces as 
one of their contributions towards the school. Different communities provided temporary 
learning spaces from churches to village meeting places and later more permanent place s for 
the construction of the schools. At the beginning of the meetings, different members of the 
communities played the role of selecting teachers based on the set criteria by the NGOs and 
the SOE. A school management committee (SMC) was then formed. Two parents, the village 
elder, two women and the selected teachers formed this committee. The School Management 
Committees (SMC) are answerable to the education administrator at the SOE payam level 
who in turn works with the field education officer at the county level, and reports to the 
County Education Officer and in most cases the NGO helping to support the program. 
The role of the committee was to provide orderly and coordinated administrative support to 
the community girls' schools and act as a link between the schools the communities and the 
county education office. Responsibilities included overseeing the construction with locally 
available resource of the learning centers, supervisory and evaluation roles of the teachers 
including the disciplinary role where necessary. 
In many cases where the SMCs were active and involved, the schools not only functioned 
well but also performed better. Teachers felt supported and motivated and innovations and 
creativity of improving the schools was seen. This however was not the case where the SM Cs 
were lax. In one school for example the community came together to grow sorghum for the 
school and help repair the school center, while another community took as long as two years 
just to construct a school. 
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Partnerships 
The running of the community girls' schools involved different partners at different levels. 
The communities provided the space for learning, helped recruit teachers and manage the 
schools. The Education office at the county level assisted in selecting the FEO and the NGO's 
assisted the communities in building the schools by providing subsidized grant of USD 200 
for each school; training teachers, SMC's and FEO's, and paying teachers and FEO's. A 
good point to note here is that, given that the NGOs provided financial support, the tendency 
to rely on the NGO was high. There was pressure on the NGOs from the donors to scale up 
and reduce cost and this was a challenge on the part of the NGOs. The communities felt that 
the international NGO's had money and could do more while on the other hand the donors 
argued that the costs of the schools were too high and should be reduced. This often times 
caused tensions with the different partners and made the running of the schools difficult. 
Financing 
As mentioned earlier funds came exclusively from SBEP as financed by USAID and 
UNICEF. Teachers were paid a lunch allowance ofUSD 15 per month during refresher 
trainings, which were conducted every month. The amount differed from one organization to 
another and became one issue of contention among teachers and NGOs. The pay is one 
example where the development terms of some NGOs did not mandate the paying of teachers 
which was termed as a "government responsibility". On the other hand, the government 
clearly did not have the resources or the means. Even where the amount was given the 
allowance was called "lunch money" to accommodate the restriction within the contractual 
obligation. The community saw this as rather hypocritical and accused the NGOs of being 
mean and their government removed from reality. "Where do they (NGO) expect the 
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government to get the money? They have too much right now. Even the soldiers have not been 
paid leave alone teachers. You the NGOs have money." (COS Community leader) Organizing 
and running costs for all trainings were also financed by the NOOs. Each community was 
given USD200 to help in building a semi-structure. This money was an attempt to hasten the 
building process and also practically help the SMC's in simple financial management. This 
later on proved to be a challenge on two levels: firstly, the communities' felt that the 
maintenance of the center was the role of the NOOs and not theirs and secondly, this did not 
in many cases hasten the building process as envisioned it would. 
In a meeting held between the implementing NOOS (UNICEF and SBEP) and the MOEST, 
the initial cost of the school for the first year was calculated to be $67, much higher than the 
$42 per pupil at primary schools. (COSP review meeting report 2004) 
Analysis of the Case Study 
The task of implementing COS in south Sudan involved various partners and given the 
complexity of the context, initial efforts and challenges were addressed on isolated basis 
based on the implementing NOO's priorities and set objectives for the schools. It was not 
until later as more NOOs became involved and continual pressure from SOE for organizations 
to work with the ministry that coordination meetings were organized. These even then were 
usually ad hoc and depended on the leading NOOs in Alternative Education to take lead. COS 
was seen as part of the Alternative Education System. In the meetings however, issues to do 
with COS were usually glossed over as other 'important' programs were discussed. In many 
of these meetings, the challenges faced by COS were usually mentioned but discussions on 
how to go about this rarely happened. This discussion became a raw sore with SOE 
unmoving, and SBEP stress on quality and effectiveness of the programs. Caught between 
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contractual obligation and compromises of quality with low funds, SBEP for example decided 
to maintain the status quo without expansion of programs. 
For the four years since the programs started running the first CGS meeting was held in June 
2005. Given the location and timing, the attendance included participants not directly 
involved in CGS and knew nothing about the schools. This meant that time was first spent 
orienting the large group of people on what CGS was, the rationale and all, most of who were 
not interested. While the minutes show that crucial discussions took place, the decisions made 
were vague, unrealistic and unachievable. It is no wonder that the impact of the meeting was 
felt financially but not so much when it came to programs implementations. 
On the issue regarding CGSP graduates completing G.3 future support 
The discussants proposed 
Construction of girls' upper primary schools in every payam (local district) by community 
with support from implementing agency before the end of 2005 or early 2006 
Printing of CGSP pupils' text books (Upper Classes) by supporting agencies before the 
end of 2005 
Recruitment of teachers for those schools the preference to be given to female teachers. 
Those model schools should be boarding. WFP and other agencies can support those 
schools with food and other boarding facilities. 
Supplies of schools uniforms for those girls in upper primary classes 
Water and first aids facilities i.e. PHCU 
(Sample taken from the minutes held in 2005 CGS coordination meeting.) 
The schools on the other hand were a great attraction for girls and to the NGOS an easy 
access to reach girls. One consultant saw the schools as "a bait" to get funding and did not 
really believe in the schools strategy or see their future. "You want money you quote CGS 
and the numbers will get you money. That's the language to use." (Consultant for CGS 
curriculum). In the next section, we shall begin to take a brief closer look at the key actors 
involved in implementing CGS in south Sudan. 
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Actors involved 
USAID 
USAID is one of the major donors to education and one of the major donors to education in 
South Sudan. As a development agency, the agency was the first to commit funds over 
20million US dollars towards education for development and reconstruction in South Sudan 
through a consortium of organizations led by CARE along with AIR and the Center for 
International Education at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. USAID believes 
strategic investment in education has value not just in economic development but also in the 
development of democratic institutions, a healthy nation and ultimately contributes to the 
national security of the country (Fiske & Foster, 2005). The Agency works hard towards 
eliminating barriers to education especially of marginalized groups by working towards 
improving access, equity and quality of education. (Fiske & Foster, 2005). 
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In south Sudan, USAID Strategic Objective concerns were on access and equitable quality 
basic education. The performance towards these objectives was monitored under three 
Intermediate Results, IR. The community girl's schools were specifically under IR 3.1 
"Improved Non-Formal Education for out of school youth and adults by developing 
community based literacy and vocational skills programs." The importance of the schools 
was also occasionally mentioned under IR2 that stated "Increased Capacity of primary 
schools to deliver quality education especially for girls. (PMP-SBEP, south Sudan. 2003.) 
While the commitment to girls' education was unquestionable, CGS was not afforded the 
same commitment in terms of resources and support, even though results were expected. This 
compounded the implementation challenges as well as any coordination efforts needed. As 
one staff commented, 
"Although programming in support of girls education gender was high on the agenda, the 
CGS program did not enjoy enthusiastic supportfrom USAID over the long-term. " SBEP 
staff interview. 
SBEP 
The Sudan Basic Education Program was consortium of three main organizations namely; 
CARE as the lead, AIR and CIE-UMass. SBEP main task was to work with the SOE to 
develop the basic education system for the south Sudan. As an implementing body, the three 
organizations worked together under incredible challenges to meet the USAID and SOE 
objectives at the same time trying to ensure that as the organizations entrusted with the 
program, quality issues were not compromised. Caught between the demands from the 
donors, contractual obligations, SOE and community expectations, decision-making were not 
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always an easy thing. The question of whether to increase the numbers of school over quality 
and contextual issues and demands such as the fact that both boys and girls needed schools 
became on of the issues to consider. While on one hand, SOE insisted on the need for the 
programs, USAID demanded the numbers promised in the contractual obligation, SBEP tried 
to reason over the issues of costs and quality both of which were hugely being compromised. 
With time, CGS was like a "sore" to be dealt with. 
Aside the 20 million dollars from USAID, SBEP managed other programs like the AGSP 
(Ambassadors Girls Scholarship Program) whose main objective was to support girls' 
education. The program was initiated in 2005. It was expected that through this program, the 
CGS girls would also benefit from the scholarships and peer counseling. Books on HIV I AIDS 
were written and diaries that were supposed to benefit the girls published. The efforts were 
uncoordinated and for a program that was always competing for funds, some of the activities 
were not important. Distributing the diaries and books on HIV I AIDS became difficult as what 
teachers and communities needed were textbooks pays and not materials they could not 
understand. Field officers tired of being criticized refused to take the materials to schools. By 
the time SBEP contract was ending in 2006, funds were yet to be disbursed to school. 
UNICEF 
UNICEF as a way of addressing access to girls' education initiated CGS. The assumption was 
that given some similarities in context, such as low resource area, need to involve the 
community among others, BRAC model would work in south Sudan. UNICEF funded a trip 
with key SOE stakeholders to Bangladesh as an educational trip. The results were that the 
SOE adapted the BRAC model for the south Sudan context. UNICEF major role was that of 
an initiator after which they handed over to the community and offered minimal support. 
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Initial support was given to train supervisors by consultants from BRAC in Bangladesh, some 
one time initial stipend to help put up a structure and later supporting the teachers' stipend. 
UNICEF continued to be involved from a distance by subcontracting the projects to small 
NGOs and handed over some of the schools to the County education Officers who with no 
resources and low human capacity could do so much. 
The Secretariat of Education and the Community 
Despite the war, the SPLM movement has always been in support of education and had 
established the education unit ran by the SOE. Given that they had little technical expertise 
and no financial support, they mainly relied on the NGO's for support. (Deng, 2003). This 
however does not mean that they had no manpower, while they lacked financial support; they 
were beginning to put in place systems and policies in preparation for the peace. This 
sometimes meant that they were in loggerheads with the NGOs who had been operating 
independently. Delay brought about by bureaucracies between the Non-state actors and 
NGOS became a common challenge through out the program. In one of the interviews on of 
the official remarked that ' ... these NGO's sometimes they do what they want.". 
Coordinating for example curriculum writing took longer than was envisioned. The first 
cohort for example saw the books when they were in their third grade. 
The communities were also an active part in implementing the CGS as they were to be the 
managers for these programs. A lot has been discussed earlier on their expected involvement. 
I need to point out here that there was a lot of expectation from the community on the NGO's 
and from the NGO's on the community. The community had heard that 20 million dollars had 
been given towards education and they didn't understand why they had to contribute to build 
58 
the schools given especially that they were poor. This added to the coordination challenges 
with the communities. 
Analysis of Actors involved 
This section will summarize the role played by the different actors based on the following 
Their major roles in the COS (funders, implementers, technical expertise) and their 
contributions and expertise (political, financial, technical)Their main mandate as an 
organization, what they proposed as their main objective and saw as their responsibility and 
hence their commitment in terms of what they were looking for and working towards and 
finally 
What was at stake, if they did not accomplish their roles and what strategy did they use and 
finally 
The challenges and concerns that each of these actors had. 
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Actors Role and At stake Strategy Challenge/Concern 
Mandate 
USAID-Donor 
Equity, Access and Cost effectiveness of Impose strict conditions Detached from field reality 
Quality of girls education resources committed 
Earmark resources Not flexible 
Accountability of Funds Contractual Obligations-
reports Follow up of target results Concerned more about target and 
Deliverables: Quantity of numbers than quality 
schools and the Number of 
girls enrolled. 
SOE- Government Policy 
and goals, implementers 
South Sudanese Impose conditions and try to Lack of capacity and resources 
Equity, Access, quality of education provide structure in terms of 
girls education where to work and with who Geographical Challenge hence 
Coherence amongst detached from day-to-day reality 
Policy and goals of many actors Rely on NGO's especially for 
education funds & technical support Mainly Recognized through 
Their authority is not NGO's 
Politics of South Sudanese usurped Mandate and approve all 
Education materials such as curriculum Politics of scale -up due to needs, 
Their goals are demands and political purposes 
implemented yet without resources 
Slow bureaucratic NGO's 
SBEP-NGO-
implementer, technical Work closely with the SOE Rigid policies with no room for 
expertise, Contractual obligation and community to implement flexibility 
with donors, SOE and and discuss alternative 
Actors Role and At stake Strategy Challenge/Concern 
Mandate 
Equity, Access, quality of community strategies Quality concern over a poor 
girls education adaptation of BRAC model 
The quality of girls 
education for both boys Limit the scale up of schools Hesitant commitment of funds for 
and girls and contain the number of 
schools to what was already Community, SOE and donor 
started demands without much financial 
support 
Support as few schools as 
possible and avoid further 
commitment of funds 
Concentrate on other 
alternatives such as the ALP 
Commit funds to finishing the 
books 
UNICEF-
Initiators, donors and As an initiator, the Work with the community to Concerned about the costs of the 
technical support success of the BRAC help in the initial start up then schools 
model was at stake hand over management to 
Equity, Access of girls community Concerned over the sustenance of 
education Number of girls the schools beyond the third 
attending schools Fund consultants from BRAC grade. 
to come and train south 
Donor obligations Sudanese supervisors 
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Summary Analysis of Coordination Issues 
The major thrust of this case study was to look at coordinating around technical 
programming and the summary will mainly look at that. However, it is worth 
mentioning that poor coordination and agreement over resources among the 
NGOS cannot be overlooked. Simple issues such as the cost of schools, writing 
materials and who would do them were rarely agreed upon and the NGOs that 
seemed to have the largest pool of money was assumed to take lead. This back and 
forth led to delays in program implementation. Each NGO did what they wanted 
and claimed to know best in their own way, much to the chagrin of the SOE who 
with limited resources could not do much. 
Political factors including tensions around who was the final decision maker, how 
programs were to be organized and managed differed largely based on who was 
calling the shots and where the NGOs got their funding from. When it came to 
decision making on the program, those that controlled the largest purse and 
influenced how decisions were made. That there were more than one, made the 
decision making fickle. On one hand we had UNICEF, the mother of the project, 
and SBEP, very involved and working closely with the SOE as mandated but 
frustrated by the daily oversight and technical issues that compromised tensions, 
yet bound by a contractual obligation. SOE on the other hand, was seen as the 
final buck stopper. However, with the challenge of money, other pressures, 
completely relying on NGOs to implement and unmoving from the ideal of a CGS 
Actors Role and At stake Strategy Challenge/Concern 
Mandate 
COMMUNITY- Too much expected from them in 
Implementers, Given that these were Given that NGOs are terms of contribution of their 
managers, girls schools, boys temporary, get as much as you time, and resources. 
education was at stake can from then, hence most 
Concerned over the over demanded full brick schools Lack of financial and human 
all education of their Preserving their cultures and not temporary buildings resources as demanded by the 
children both boys and Lagging behind in Have both boys and girls in NGOs such as female teachers 
girls. education and hence schools 
missing out of its Did not understand the roles of 
privileges the government or NGOs 
Others-EDC, AGSP-
donors and Take advantage of the existing Language barrier. Most of the 
implementers Contractual obligations schools to encourage others to programs were written in English 
and the success of their come and hence increase the coupled with Para-teachers who 
Access to girls education- programs number of girls attending had difficulty in following and 
AGSP classes translating the radio programs 
Number of girls 
Access and Quality of accessing education Train teachers, supervisors and 
education through trainers to assist the girls 
alternative media-EDC 
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Summary Analysis of Coordination Issues 
The major thrust of this case study was to look at coordinating around technical 
programming and the summary will mainly look at that. However, it is worth 
mentioning that poor coordination and agreement over resources among the NGOS 
cannot be overlooked. Simple issues such as the cost of schools, writing materials 
and who would do them were rarely agreed upon and the NGOs that seemed to 
have the largest pool of money was assumed to take lead. This back and forth led to 
delays in program implementation. Each NGO did what they wanted and claimed 
to know best in their own way, much to the chagrin of the SOE who with limited 
resources could not do much. 
Political factors including tensions around who was the final decision maker, how 
programs were to be organized and managed differed largely based on who was 
calling the shots and where the NGOs got their funding from. When it came to 
decision making on the program, those that controlled the largest purse and 
influenced how decisions were made. That there were more than one, made the 
decision making fickle. On one hand we had UNICEF, the mother of the project, 
and SBEP, very involved and working closely with the SOE as mandated but 
frustrated by the daily oversight and technical issues that compromised tensions, yet 
bound by a contractual obligation. SOE on the other hand, was seen as the final 
buck stopper. However, with the challenge of money, other pressures, completely 
relying on NGOs to implement and unmoving from the ideal of a CGS despite the 
ground reality. So while the SOE had one idea of what a CGS should look like the 
different NGOs implemented according to their small resources. Decisions from 
the SOE wavered between the two and rarely were something agreed upon. The 
textbook case is a good example. The curriculum was developed twice and it took 
more than three years for the books to be printed. The decision of who was to take 
up the task was assumed and not clearly articulated. When this was resolved, one 
organization backed out as they printing of books were not part of the agenda. Seen 
as an easy scale up, and easy way to count gender numbers, the CGS continued to 
be maintained as solutions were sought rarely approaching the ground for 
alternatives approaches beyond individual NGOs environments. 
Technical issues 
Given that there were many organizations involved in implementing the program, 
we shall take a closer look at how coordination efforts were organized and carried 
out, who was involved and outcomes that came from these meetings. Based on 
experience and reports that came from the interviews, the coordination ofNFE 
programs among the involved actors was accomplished chiefly through bi-annual 
AES meetings, where CGS was one of the agenda as an AES program. These 
meetings generally included representatives of SOE and implementing agencies. As 
one representative put it, 'but rarely (if ever), in my experience, did coordination 
meetings include representatives from beneficiary communities or donor agencies. " 
(Interviewee) 
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The meetings were dependent on availability and priorities of the principle 
implementer and financers of the AES meeting namely SBEP, SCFUK and 
occasionally UNICEF. It was not rare to have the meetings cancelled or postponed. 
Very little occurred in these meetings beyond a summary of activities from each 
partner, and what they intended to do. The purpose of these meetings was 
ostensibly to share information and take action to improve programs. Given that 
CGS was not a high priority, little outcome if any came from these meetings. The 
general tone of the meeting was not very positive as each implementing agency felt 
that donor support of the CGS was lukewarm and that continued support was in 
question. 
The result was that the key implementer, UNICEF and SBEP continued to work 
independently and with occasional sharing of information where necessary. The 
schools lacked clear direction as to what was to happen next, quality was affected 
as the costs continued to be incurred. Technical issues such as transitions of the 
girls who had completed third grade to join the primary school were rarely 
discussed. Since none of the organizations were willing to commit further funding 
to the improvement of the schools, the SOE put its foot down and demand that the 
NGOs take the responsibility and commit to finishing the CGS curriculum and print 
the books. The task fell to SBEP who were doing the curriculum writing of al the 
AES books despite the fact there were no resources allocated for the curriculum 
design for CGS. 
65 
No one at some point new exactly when and where the graduates of the school 
would continue and join the primary schools. Each region or state performed its 
own evaluation and continued to count the numbers. This defeated the purpose of 
the coordination meetings. 
The community was not involved in these meetings or the FEO's. Sometimes 
given the location, the nearest official or representative would be sent for the 
meeting to report on the 'progress' of the schools. 
Given this context, I look at coordination as a continuous process and not an end to 
itself. The process of coming together of all the actors involved in implementing a 
program so as to share, integrate information that will lead to actions that will 
positively effect resource allocation, planning, implementation and evaluation of 
programs, thus creating synergies of best practice. This means that, actors come 
together to strategically plan not just on who will do what when, but also resource 
allocation given the specific Post-Conflict context. 
Based on the interviews and discussion from various interviewees from the case 
study, the following coordination issues were cited as contributing to coordination 
failure 
• Coordination efforts often do not include all stakeholders. In most cases, 
coordination meetings are held between what is called "key stake holders" 
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which in most cases can be translated to mean 'key donors" the controllers of 
the purse. This often overlooks and undermines other actors especially the 
community who are supposed to be the real managers of these schools. While 
there appears to be strategies and frameworks developed to help in 
coordination, these are rarely translated at field level. 
• Coordination efforts are not always done concurrently at all levels among 
donors, implementers, and beneficiaries, as they are dependent on the 
priorities of these agencies. Some of these agencies and donors see the role of 
coordination as not key to their overall program and a waste of time. 
• Coordination rhetoric is often incorporated into programs, but not mechanism 
for achieving unity of action. 
• Coordination efforts often commence after projects are well under way and 
stakeholders have already invested significant time, resources and effort in 
"their way of doing things" and are reluctant to change or consider flexibility 
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CHAPTER4 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The reality and challenges of implementing programs in Post-Conflict areas cannot 
be underscored. All actors involved are faced with the challenge of working in not 
just new programs but the context. In many cases, coordination efforts have been 
translated to mean more meetings usually attended by the coordinators of the 
projects. While these efforts are important, they demand time and resources as well 
and if not well planned can be a source of frustration and a waste of resources. 
Coordination however should be more than just meetings for program updates but 
rather should be focused on sharing information that will lead to action on resource 
utilization, planning, implementation and evaluation. 
As stated earlier, and in the context of development programs, coordination 
engages all stakeholders in the process of sharing and integrating information 
leading to actions that effect resource allocation, planning, implementation, and 
evaluation, thus creating synergies of best practice. 
It is amazing the number of organizations that were involved in implementing the 
community girls' schools and yet committing directly to funding the schools 
themselves. Most of the schools became what one NGO worker termed as 'a bait to 
catch the fish' (Interviewee). The reality of the situation is that the need for girl's 
education became a niche to attract funding and CGS became easy numbers to 
report on the progress. This may be what Pullan (1999) refers to moral purpose, 
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which he continues to say that it should not merely be stated but has to be followed 
by some action, proper strategies so as to achieve the stated purpose. Why for 
example would we want to build schools for girls in a place where there were no 
schools for all the children nearby and expect that the communities will allow girls 
to go to school and leave boys behind and thus creating inequity and rivalry? What 
is the moral justification in this? Perhaps even with the rush for and competing for 
resources, NGOs need to be guided by the moral purpose and not start programs 
without willing to attach importance to the program and finances as well. In a Post-
conflict setting, any program no matter how small has repercussions and should not 
be over looked. 
From a technical point of view and in terms of strategic planning and implementation 
of the program, poor coordination led to 
Ineffective oversight: the assumption that because BRAC had worked in 
Bangladesh it would work in South Sudan without considering al the small details 
that goes with transferring the program contributed to the very challenges in 
implementing programs. For example, BRAC in Bangladesh invests in a detailed 
network of supervision and support of materials to the schools, both of which were 
lacking in south Sudan. A 10-day training of the FEO's who sometimes ended up 
being poached by other organizations could not compete with the need and demands 
of the program. The lack of clarity to all stakeholders for example by SBEP at the 
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onset of the program of how to run and implement these schools to of program, lack 
of clarity in terms of setting the goals 
Recommendation 
Involve community in designing programs. By involving I mean not just going and 
telling them what to do but really planning and working with communities. 
Clarify goals, responsibility, roles, accountability and leadership with all actors 
Communicate, Listen - negotiate-trust. This cannot be over stated. 
Flexibility in adapting to the context and needs of the programs. This includes the 
flexibility from all sides including the government and the donors. 
Binding differing objectives/mandates: Different actors had different objectives 
and mandates in implementing the program and these were developed elsewhere and 
at different times. EDC and AGSP for example were involved three years after the 
programs were developed and while they were needed, the programs were developed 
in isolation. This further contributed to lax involvement and the feeling that the 
schools were used for experimental purposes. Further more the push and pull 
between the organizations, over quality versus quantity among other issues did not 
auger well and while these are valid issues, these were discussed in isolation and 
hence lacked proper follow up. 
Recommendations 
Donors, governments and other implementers should plan based on a need 
assessment and not on what they have had works in other areas. Sometimes best 
70 
practices in one context may not be the best in a different context and the reality of 
this should be considered. 
Actors should be flexible to adapt the program to the context through continuous 
monitoring and evaluation that helps to give constructive feedback throughout the 
program on issues of quality and effectiveness of programs. This means being brave 
enough to accept the reality and change programs especially if they compromise the 
quality of education 
Where a proper needs assessment has been done and all actors involved, a Bottom-
up approach in planning should be used so that the communities' needs are included. 
This can be done through Participatory action research approaches and through 
continual monitoring and evaluations done through out the life of the programs. 
Conclusion 
As someone who participated in implementing the program, I kept wondering what 
I would do differently if I were to manage the program again? One thing that I 
would be hesitant to do is to commit to a project without fully understanding how 
much resources are needed and is committed towards the project. The need to 
understanding the program, the history and the politics within is important 
especially is one is to head any program. I do understand that some of the tacit 
knowledge has to be learned in the field, I would appreciate for example to know 
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who are the key players and why. The following are some of the recommendations 
that I would propose in terms of coordination in implementing programs. 
Through out this case study, the importance of clarity in communication became an 
apparent need when it comes to implementing programs. 
Coordination at the top level without involving the community is not enough as it is 
detached from the realities of the community and environment. Even governments 
and state-actors in post-conflict can be detached from the realities of the field. This 
includes planning with the community based on the needs and including the plans as 
in the proposals. It was always easier when we went t the communities and reminded 
them of what they had agreed to do versus when we told tried to convince them what 
to do. When this has not been done for example when proposal are written under 
time constraint and pressure, the NGOs should at least take time t learn the 
environment and allow for flexibility before committing to projects. 
Making a purposeful planning for programs at the beginning and budget for it-current 
programs are still very institutionalized, IASC, cluster, challenges are in the field not 
in New York or Nairobi, the temptations to give solutions for people in the filed is 
most times interpreted as condescending, for example one of the reason why the 
community took so long to build the one roomed structures is that they were not 
involved in the first place in deciding if they wanted a one room or not,, semi-
structured or not. 
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If indeed we accept the importance of coordinating programs especially where many 
actors are involved, then we need to allocate funds towards these plans in 
consideration of the context. In South Sudan for example, transportation was mainly 
by flight, which was very expensive, especially given that these meetings hardly 
went over three hours. Coordinating is expensive and hence should be well planned 
to maximize time and resources. Meeting for the sake of meeting is not enough, or 
meetings just to update one another are a waste of resource and information can be 
shared over emails. Where meetings are planned, an agenda clearly stating its 
objective and expected outcome should be shared tied in with the responsible person 
to follow up. 
Transparency rather than avoidance. This includes the transparency of finances and 
the technical progress f the programs. At one point, it was clear that the CGS were 
not doing very well and while this was discussed, there was never a clear decision on 
how to move forward and a commitment towards the same. 
Setting and agreeing on boundaries of what the organization can do with the 
communities. Many times, we are tempted to or pushed towards "scale up" 
sometimes without clarity of what this means or entails. I recognize the pressures 
especially where there is great need but perhaps we need to learn to prioritize and 
target must be done and what can wait including the use of resources. Recognizing 
that we cannot do everything and specializing rather than experimenting. 
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I continue to be amazed at the number of resources that are available at higher 
levels such as materials available amongst the UN humanitarian wing, the NGO 
decision makers and technical adviser's level, yet none of these until recently has 
been made known to the people working in the field. Given this knowledge, I would 
at least have the government officials and field workers aware of what is available in 
the numerous meetings that continue to be held and in trainings, hence try to clarify 
the objectives of the meetings. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
Planned CGSP, Partners' Coordination Meeting 
Tentative Time Table. (22-23) June, 2005-
Day one- 22, June, 2005. 
TOPIC TIME FACILITATOR 
Introductions 9: 00- 9: 30 am Masale Aggrey 
Opening Remarks 9: 30-10.00 am Mr. Tedd Bathoub 
Matters arising from 10.00-10: 30 Massamino Allam 
previous minutes 
Tea break 10: 30-11.00 am All 
Update of activities 11:00 am-12: 30 pm 
Reactions from 12: 30 -1: 00 pm Massamino Allam 
plenary 
Lunch bireak 1;00-2:30pm All 
Emerging lessons 2: 30- 3: 30 pm Ghor Dhal 
Reactions from 3: 30 -4: 00 pm Allam. 
Plenary 
Tea break 4:00- 4: 30 pm All 
Group discussion on 4:30-5 : 00 pm- Team leader of 
thematic areas each group 
Day two--23 June, 2005. 
Group discussions 9: 00- 9: 30 am T earn leader of 
continue each group 
Group presentations 9: 30-10: 30 am Representative of 
each group 
Tea Break 10: 30- 11: 30 am All 
Reactions from 11: 30 am - 12 :00 
plenary pm 
Recommendations 12: 00- 12; 30 pm Masale Aggrey 
Wrap up and closer 12: 3 0- 1 : 00 pm Tedd Bauthou 
Lunch 1: 00 - All 
REMARKS 
CGSP. Coord. 
Assit. D/director 
administration 
DI Director 
national 
languages. 
Task Force 
D/Director 
national lang. 
Task Force 
Teacher trainer 
Task Force 
In groups 
In groups 
Plenary 
Task Force 
To be identified 
Assist. 
D/Directoe 
Administration 
Task Force 
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Appendix 2 
Sample report from the 2005 CGS Coordination meeting. 
Objectives : By the end of 2007, the program aims: 
• To Construct 1000+ Community girls schools in remote villages. 
• Enroll 30,000+ girls into schools from remote villages 
• To train 1000+ teachers for the program. 
• To train school management committees (SMCs) for each school. 
• To establish regional offices for coordination of program. 
• To partner with other agencies as a strategy for expansion of program. 
Review/Follow up of Recommendations from Previous Minutes 
Action By Whom Time-Frame 
1. Teachers' guide to be completed quickly (Grades 1, 2 & 
3 ). Pupils' books and guides to be produced and Aggrey Nov 2005 
distributed. 
2. Review of existing CGSP trainers' materials by Aggrey 
SOE/Partners for execution in schools Aug 2005 
3. Mother-tongue materials to be ordered from schools, Aggrey 
vetted, validated and approved for use in schools by SOE Sept 2005 
Partners 
4. Done 
5. Review of the current in-service teacher education Aggrey 
programmer Aug 2005 
6. CGSP structure below national coordinator to be Aggrey 
implemented July 2005 
7. Brochure to be completed and distributed Aggrey July 2005 
8. Training of School Management Committees (SM Cs) CGSP Trainers Aug 2005 
9. Technical support to CGSP staff to improve the quality of 
learning (provision of FEO kits, fuel for motor bikes, 4 
laptop computers, dictionaries, office furniture and office 
space, training of staff on computer skills, and tents for 
starter offices) UNICEF/SBEP 
10. Inclusion of CGSP tutors in CECs and RTTis SOE 
11. Done 
12. Expansion strategies (extension of programme to other Aggrey 
counties, and extension of centers 
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Recommendations Arising: 
Action By Whom Time-Frame 
I. Minutes to be circulated to all members concerned Rose/Hakim Two weeks 
2. 9-day TOT course UNICEF/SBEP September 2005 
3. Provision of sufficient FEO kits UNICEF/SBEP July 2005 
4. Training of FEOs CGSP Trainers July 2005 
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